Social constructivism has come of age in contemporary international relations (IR) theory.
Introduction
national identities (converging or diverging). From this, he constructs a 2 x 2 table (Figure 1 .2, p.28) mapping out four spaces that define different types of international relations/structure: hierarchy, hegemony, security community and anarchy.
For the United States, Nau empirically measures the structure of relative power and identity in US relations with various countries, and locates the resulting configurations of identity and power in one of the cells in the 2 x 2. He then "reason [s] deductively from these structural circumstances to extrapolate the broad constraints on US foreign policy options" (p.28), which allows him to prescribe the proper American grand strategy in a variety of settings. This he does in chapters 4-7, providing a sweeping overview of US relations with all world regions. The analysis and, indeed, advocacy, in these chapters is in the best of the policy studies tradition, with his rich empirics informed by broad theoretical hunches.
Of course, Nau's theoretical structuralism and broad empirical scope are not cost-free, raising at least three issues and dilemmas. First, some will question the author's understanding and use of identity. Consistent with his (implicit) positivist orientation, identity for Nau is largely a fixed variable that can be read off a state's domestic politics (see, especially, p.28) . In contrast, constructivist scholars like Hopf and Zehfuss (see below) would see identities as multiple, contingent and fluid.
Second, national identity -as the book unfolds -more and more comes down to domestic politics (pp.122, 151, 166, 222-23, 237, 240) . National identities change when domestic policies and institutions and national political institutions change (p.240). This is fine, but why call something identity when it is domestic politics/institutions that are invoked? In turn, this suggests Nau's constructivist account would have benefited by drawing upon the rich menu of domestic-political arguments available in the comparative literature.
Third, the author's effort to build bridges between constructivism and its theoretical rivals comes up short. For one, the architecture of Nau's bridge is not clear. The reader gets no clear sense for how constructivism and, in this case, realism, are to be integrated theoretically. To be fair, this was probably not Nau's intent, as the book is best viewed as a theoretically informed historical and contemporary narrative and not as a hypothesis testing exercise aimed at theoretical synthesis.
3 Still, the bridgebuilding language raises expectations. In this respect, it is a pity that Nau did not utilize his rich empirics to explore the real world plausibility of various conceptual schemes for achieving synthesis that have been advanced in recent years -temporal sequencing arguments, ideas about scope conditions and domains of application, and the like (March and Olsen 1998; Fearon and Wendt 2002; Caporaso, Checkel and Jupille 2003b ).
In addition, Nau's bridge has only one lane, with the flow of traffic going from conventional constructivism to realism and rationalism. Yet, in principle, the whole idea of a middle ground (Adler 1997) was to situate constructivism between rationalism/positivism and post-modern/interpretative approaches, with bridges being built in both directions. In reality, however, the overwhelming majority of the literature has done just as Nau. This is a serious problem, one that has rightly worried many European constructivists. Hopf does -its actual design will be difficult. Not only are there the time and resource constraints just mentioned; at some basic level, epistemological differences, despite the best efforts of scholars like Wendt (1999), do 'gum up the works' -a point to which I return below.
Identity

Constructivism and German Military Power. A way around the dilemmas just
highlighted is to deny all possibilities of bridge building, which is one message to emerge from Maja Zehfuss's assertive critique of constructivism (pp.253-54, passim).
Zehfuss, who teaches at the University of Warwick, takes no prisoners. While she is most critical of the conventional constructivist project, other scholars closer to her own critical/interpretative position come under attack as well.
The core of the book (chapters 1-4, 6) is destructive or, more properly put, Wendt's theory begins to unravel.
In the remainder of chapter 2 and in the next two chapters as well, Zehfuss advances a number of other criticisms of Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf, highlighting gaps and inconsistencies in their approaches. Such analysis reinforces her overall claim that constructivism is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions. This is a strong statement -one that nonetheless can be challenged on two grounds.
For one, Zehfuss's conclusions might have been different if she had engaged the more empirically oriented work inspired by these three individuals. At several points in the book (p.33 [footnote], pp.186-87), the author does indeed address this issue, noting she will not make use of the "more empirical work" published by Wendt, Kratochwil or Onuf as it remains "abstract," "leaves off before getting to the practicalities," and "provides little to work with for those wishing to analyse what is construed as the empirical reality of international politics." While this seems an accurate assessment, it leaves the reader puzzling as to why Zehfuss does not then engage the by now extensive empirical literature inspired by the work of these scholars. that it was full of conceptual inconsistencies, shallow in terms of empirical verification and wrapped up in a self-referential 'citation cartel' (Green and Shapiro 1994; see also Walt 1999; Olsen 2001) . More recently, the realist research program has undergone a revival, with many arguing for a return to its classical roots.
However, this has led observers to question if such scholarship is not smuggling in assumptions on the role of beliefs or domestic politics that are inconsistent with realism's core (Legro and Moravscik 1999) . My point simply is that the tensions and inconsistencies that Zehfuss so carefully uncovers in the constructivist project may be inherent to most forms of social science theorizing.
This said, Zehfuss is to be praised for using her book to address another, related issue.
Towards the end (pp.246-49), she acknowledges that all social science, including the constructivist sort, is about trade offs. As researchers, we have to start somewhere.
However, the choices we make "are not innocent. The choice of a beginning opens up certain avenues of thinking and closes down others" (p.248). These are obvious, almost commonsensical, insights, which she documents empirically throughout the
book. Yet, they should be kept centrally in mind as constructivists go about building their bridges.
Lacunae and Challenges
Despite my criticisms, the three books under review deserve a wide readership among constructivists and IR scholars more generally. Not only do they provide a vivid sense of the diversity and disagreements that characterize constructivist scholarship.
Their lucid writing style also helps a critical reader see flaws and gaps in the argumentation, thus making it that much easier to explore those challenging 'where next' questions.
Domestic Politics.
At the risk of sounding like a broken record (Checkel 1998, 342-47) , IR constructivists could still benefit by taking domestic politics more seriously.
Despite my critiques of Hopf on this score, his manuscript demonstrates the clear benefits of a domestic move. For constructivists in particular, greater attention to the domestic realm is essential because many of their key 'variables' -identities, discourse, public spheres, institutions, norms -are likely to be more robust, embedded and institutionalized at the national level (see also Hopf, .
Consider Europe.
If there is any region in the world where the international/supranational should trump the national, it is here. The continent is densely institutionalized and, in the European Union (EU), it has something that is far more than a classic intergovernmental organization or regime; rather, the consensus view among most Europeanists and many politicians is that it is a polity in the making. Yet, a growing body of empirical research -some conducted by constructivists -shows that European identities, discourses and public spheres are still dominated by their national counterparts or, at best, co-exist uneasily side by side with them (Checkel 1999; Olsen 2002; Risse and Maier 2003; Lewis 2003; Beyers 2003 It was only when I presented my findings at several meetings that interpretative constructivist colleagues pointed to a theoretical-methodological gap in the analysis.
Simply put, particular agents are not only persuasive because they are authoritative or because they argue in private. Their arguments are also persuasive because they are enabled and legitimated by the broader social discourse in which they are embedded.
Did a particular agent's arguments in a particular committee resonate with this broader social discourse? To answer such questions and thus provide a more complete account of persuasion's role, it will be necessary to supplement my positivist methodologies with others more grounded in interpretative techniques.
Taking Language Seriously. Knowledgeable readers may be puzzled by this subtitle.
Do not constructivists already take language very seriously? After all, it is a central analytic category in their narratives and causal stories. Interpretative and critical constructivists focus on discourse, the mediation of meaning through language, speech acts and textual analysis. The conventional sort, by theorizing roles for arguing, persuasion, deliberation and rhetorical action, see language as a causal mechanism leading to changes in core agent properties. Thus, the question is not "whether language is important; the question is rather which approach to language" (Fierke 2002, 351 [emphasis in original]) -and, I would add, how to use it as a practical research tool.
At this level, I see two challenges facing constructivists. For interpretative and critical scholars, a key task is to continue the discussion begun by individuals like Milliken (1999) , Neumann (2003) and Hopf. Among the issues that might be addressed are the proper balance between textual approaches and those emphasizing practice (Neumann 2002; Hopf, pp.269-70) , and the degree to which these scholars need explicitly to describe and justify the sources and techniques they use to reconstruct discourses.
On the latter, I am not suggesting some sort of positivist primer that puts discourse into variable language or seeks to establish a single way of conducting such analyses.
Rather, the time is ripe for further debate about best practices for those working with discourse and texts (Milliken 1999; Neumann 2003, 1-3) . 7 The importance of such a move is highlighted by Zehfuss's book. Surprisingly, for a volume with such a strong empirical focus, the reader is given no indication for how her discourse analysis (p.83) will be conducted. Surely, Zehfuss has some rules or hunches for identifying when normative commitments are "shared amongst a number of people" (pp.120-21),
for recognizing "prominent narratives" (pp.121-22), or for how she identifies and reconstructs instances of "shared meaning" (pp.127-28). Her silence here raises questions about the validity and reliability of the reconstructions, which, as Hopf so nicely shows, are key issues for interpretative accounts as well. Ironically, if Habermasians stick to this view, they will be heading down the same problematic theory-building route as the rational choice theorists they so often criticize. The latter build their theories on 'as if' assumptions: agents act as if they are egoistical and self interested. However, if agent motivations are likewise bracketed as we develop explanatory theories on the role of arguments, we end up with the same type of 'as if' reasoning, only now assuming that agents are other-regarding and moved by the force of the better argument. In both cases, the result is bad theory that tells us little about how preferences are actually constituted (Wendt 1999, 119-22, for an excellent discussion).
Bridge Building and the Middle Ground. This has been an exciting and, increasingly, controversial topic among constructivists in recent years. By exciting, I mean that researchers have followed up general calls for bridge building (Adler 1997) with increasingly sophisticated conceptual schemas for fitting constructivism better with its rivals. These include ideas on how one can integrate the ideational and the material, game theory and social constructivism, strategic-choice and cognitive perspectives, and other-regarding and self-interested behavior (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998; Lepgold and Lamborn 2001; Lebow 2001; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2002) . At the level of research designs and strategies, scholars have been equally creative, advocating notions of sequencing, domains of application and scope conditions as ways to integrate constructivism with its theoretical rivals (March and Olsen 1998; Caporaso, Checkel and Jupille 2003b) . Collectively, these projects offer not some mushy grand theory that makes everyone happy. Rather, scholars have gotten down to the hard work of better specifying their alternative constructivist and rationalist theories, thus providing more complete yet still methodologically rigorous approaches for understanding the world around us.
The point of increasing controversy is that the bridges being built nearly all have just one lane, going from conventional constructivism to rational choice (see also Zehfuss, . Given that such bridges can in principle have two lanes (with the second going from conventional constructivism to the interpretative/critical sort), we need to understand better why this is not happening. I see four factors at work. Jupille and I were seeking to build modest (one-lane) bridges from conventional constructivism to rationalism, but still found the going tough. The problem was not our collaborators; they were willing and eager learners. However, the reality is that we all have invested significant time in particular research programs and thus have sunk costs. Reaching out to the other side (conventional constructivist or rationalist), means learning about it in sufficient detail so that one offers robust alternative arguments (and not caricatured simplifications). 9 This is not easy. Challenges of this sort are only amplified if one seeks to develop frameworks and arguments that speak to both the positivist mainstream and interpretative/critical constructivists.
Third, epistemology, is just not so easy to get around. While agreeing with Wendt (1999) that the real (meta-theoretical) issues are more ontological than epistemological, a bracketing of the latter becomes less of an option at the day-to-day, empirical levels. In the EU/institutional-theory project, for example, we hoped to include one or more interpretative constructivists doing work on European integration. However, as we thought about it more, we became increasingly worried about any such move. How would we integrate these individuals into the collaboration? Would our emphasis on 'why' questions unfairly limit and constrain his/her focus on the 'how possible'? How could the two approaches be reconciled within the context of one time-limited project that needed to maintain some level of intellectual coherence?
In the end, we chose not to include these scholars, not out of sinister motives to delegitimize their research agenda, but out of a practical concern to finish within a reasonable time frame. In the project's introduction, we discuss this dilemma openly.
This choice bears an inevitable cost in the practical exclusion of a body of scholarship of a different epistemological bent. We thus knowingly proceed partially and incrementally, aware of the terrain left uncovered. If Aspinwall and Schneider are right in suggesting that transcending epistemological differences represents a bridge too far, then our choice is one that prevents the best (epistemological agreement) from being the enemy of the good (intraepistemological, intertheoretical progress) (Caporaso, Checkel, Jupille 2003b, 24-25) .
This is not an ideal state of affairs. Basically, it means we build bridges where we can control for epistemology, which, in turn, means they have only one lane. As Sil has argued more generally, continuing epistemological disagreements "militate against the emergence of a genuinely collaborative, truly integrated field of comparative analysis" (Sil 2000, 354) .
Fourth, what if an unintended effect of exploring the middle ground is to narrow or close down the space for theoretical exploration? The latter outcome is all the more likely to occur as bridge building of the conventional-constructivist/rational-choice type becomes increasingly popular. 10 This would be a pity as one of the wonderful things about constructivism has been its ability to bring fresh theoretical and disciplinary air to IR.
Consider two examples suggestive of just such a narrowing. As argued earlier, the Hopf volume is an important and innovative contribution to the constructivist research program. That said, it is hard to imagine that any of the mainstream bridge-building projects discussed above could find a place for Hopf. This would happen not because he is uninterested; rather, they would not know what to do with him.
A second example comes from a collaborative project on European institutions and socialization (Checkel 2003b ). This endeavor seeks to make better connections between conventional constructivism and rational choice; our theoretical hook is socialization, while the regional focus is Europe (West and East). In the project, we worked hard to come up with a definition of socialization that would satisfy both constructivists and rationalists, and be sufficiently operationalized so as to allow for testing. This we did, on the whole with favorable results (Johnston 2003 ). Yet, this came at a cost. In our quest to converse across the constructivist-rationalist divide, we developed an understanding of socialization that did some injustice to commonsense definitions. Methodological and epistemological agreement was purchased at the cost of (partial) theoretical closure (Zuern 2003; see also Hopf, p.294 ).
Conclusions
Constructivism is not only trendy; it is fun. Scholars grouped under this rubric have many disagreements and fights. They often refer to each other in derogatory ways, adding the adjectives thin, thick and -in my case -emaciated to constructivist. And, yes, they still have many problems to fix. However, despite the name calling and challenges, compared to 15 years ago, we now have a much broader conceptual toolkit for understanding 'what makes the world hangs together.' As someone who has had the privilege of sitting down and taking a hard look at this literature in two separate review essays six years apart, the trend is clear -and positive. Indeed, as constructivism is applied empirically in ever more domains, pushed methodologically, theorized substantively and questioned critically, I would be very surprised if this trend line were not maintained.
